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the Effectiveness of Social Punishment**

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# THE IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL PUNISHMENT<sup>\*</sup>

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**ABSTRACT:** This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of anger and its role in motivating individuals to punish free riders. However, we find that anger also triggers retaliatory behavior by the punished individuals. This makes the enforcement of a cooperative norm more costly. We show that in addition to anger, ‘social’ emotions like guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of uncooperative actions. They play a key role by subduing the desire of punished individuals to retaliate and by motivating them to behave more cooperatively in the future.

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# 1. Introduction

An important mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is the enforcement of social norms (Ostrom, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). As shown by Fehr and Gächter (2000b), cooperative behavior can persist when there is an opportunity to punish defectors. However, although punishment can have desirable consequences, it can also have negative effects (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). For example, punishment can lead to welfare losses (Egas and Riedl, 2005) with a sometimes negligible increase in cooperation levels (Gächter and Herrmann, 2005). Studying the choices of individuals who punish as well as the reaction of those who are punished can help us predict when punishment will have negative results. Considering the role of emotions seems to be necessary to understand this kind of behavior (Loewenstein, 1996; Elster, 1999; Thaler, 2000).

The goal of this paper is to understand the type of motivations that must be present, among both the punishers and the punished, for punishment to be an effective institution for the promotion of cooperation. We concentrate on the role of social emotions, such as shame and guilt, as an essential component for the successful enforcement of cooperative norms. In particular, we are interested in their role as inhibitors of retaliatory behavior by the punished individuals.

Although it has attracted little attention, antisocial behavior such as retaliation or the punishment of cooperative individuals has been observed in various kinds of laboratory experiments, including, for example, public good games (Fehr and Gächter, 2000b), prisoner dilemma games (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2005), and moonlighting games (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2000). This type of behavior is widespread and is observed in around one quarter of all subjects (e.g. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2000; Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2004).

We study, by means of an experiment, antisocial behavior in a social dilemma game. We introduce a punishment institution where individuals who are punished always have the opportunity to retaliate. After all, if a punishment technology exists, it is likely that both the punisher and the punished have access to it. Our results show that many individuals do retaliate after being punished. In various cases, this escalates as individuals punish each other in turns. In order to observe the effect of retaliation on future behavior, subjects played the game twice. We find that although retaliation considerably increases the cost of punishing selfish behavior, it does not deter future

cooperation or punishment. Hence, its effect seems to be restricted to welfare losses caused by the destruction of resources.

Recent research has revealed that emotions motivate individuals to punish opportunistic behavior. In particular, anger has been shown to be of influence when subjects have to decide whether to punish or not. Unkind behavior induces anger and the angrier people are, the more likely they are to incur costs in order to penalize such behavior (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Quervain et al., 2004). We replicate these findings and extend this line of research by studying the emotional reaction of *punished* individuals.

In order to explain the behavior of both punishers and punished, we measure their emotional response. Our results show that individuals who act unkindly do nevertheless feel angry when punished. Furthermore, we find that high intensities of anger are related to positive retaliation. Therefore, anger alone induces multiple rounds of punishment and consequently, causes a significant destruction of resources. Thus, anger cannot explain whether punishment will effectively promote prosocial behavior. The effectiveness of punishment depends on the reaction of the individuals who are punished.

What is missing to make punishment effective is a ‘moral’ reaction of the punished. Namely, after receiving punishment the punished individual should act more cooperatively and abstain from retaliation. We show that the social emotions of shame and guilt motivate individuals to react in precisely this way. In other words, individuals do not retaliate when feelings of guilt restrain their anger-induced desire to fight back.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the design of the experiment. Section 3 describes the subjects’ behavior. In Section 4 we analyze the relationship between the emotions and the behavior of the punishers and the punished. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.


## **2. The Experiment**

Lately, punishment mechanisms have been mostly analyzed in the context of public good games (using the design of Fehr and Gächter, 2000b). However, in this study we use a simpler setting where the causes and effects of emotions can be easily observed and analyzed. To study the impact of social emotions, we used a two-person social dilemma game with and without punishment opportunities. Our game is similar to many of the social dilemma games in the literature, such as, the sequential prisoners’

dilemma, the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995), the gift exchange game (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993), and others.

## 2.1. The game

We first describe the game without punishment opportunities and then we explain how punishment is introduced. The game consists of two players taking part in a one-shot game. We will refer to these players as the ‘first mover’ and the ‘second mover’. At the start of the game, the first mover receives 150 points whereas the second mover receives 100 points (see Figure 1 for the game tree). In the first stage, the first mover decides to either defect or cooperate. If the first mover defects, he keeps his 150 points, the second mover keeps her 100 points, and the game ends. If the first mover cooperates, 50 of his 150 points are multiplied by six and transferred to the second mover. Thus, the second mover receives 300 points while the first mover loses 50 points. In the second stage, the second mover returns an amount of points ( $r$ ) back to the first mover. Specifically, she can return 150 points (an equal split of the gains), 50 points (returning exactly the points lost by the first mover), or 0 points. After the decision of the second mover the game ends. Hence, if the first mover cooperates his payoff is  $\pi_1 = 100 + r$  and the payoff of the second mover is  $\pi_2 = 100 + 6 \times 50 - r$ . This describes the game without punishment.



**FIGURE 1 – GAME TREE IN THE CASE OF NO PUNISHMENT OPPORTUNITIES**

In the game with punishment both players can assign punishment points. Doing so is costly for both players. We denote  $p_{it}$  as the amount of points assigned by player  $i$  (for  $i \in \{1,2\}$ ) in punishment round  $t$ . After the second mover decides how much to return, the first round of punishment starts. First, the first mover has the opportunity to assign

a nonnegative amount of punishment points to the second mover ( $p_{11}$ ). The first mover loses  $p_{11}$  points and the second mover loses  $4 \times p_{11}$  points. In order to avoid losses during the experiment, the first mover can assign punishment points only as long as the second mover has a positive number of points (i.e.  $\frac{1}{4}(100 + 6 \times 50 - r) \geq p_{11} \geq 0$ ). If the first mover chooses  $p_{11} = 0$  the game ends. However, if the first mover chooses  $p_{11} > 0$  the second mover is given the opportunity to assign punishment points to the first mover ( $p_{21}$ ). In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to punishment by the second mover as *retaliation*. Punishment by first movers and retaliation by second movers has the same cost and does the same amount of harm. Thus for each retaliation point assigned, the first mover loses four points. Once more, the second mover can assign retaliation points only as long the first mover has a positive number of points (i.e.  $\frac{1}{4}(100 + r - p_{11}) \geq p_{21} \geq 0$ ).<sup>1</sup> If  $p_{21} = 0$  the game ends, but if  $p_{21} > 0$  the game continues to a second round of punishment. That is, the first mover has the opportunity to assign additional punishment points to the second mover ( $p_{12}$ ). As before, if  $p_{12} = 0$  the game ends but if  $p_{12} > 0$ , the second mover has the opportunity to assign additional retaliation points ( $p_{22}$ ), and so on. The process repeats itself until either one of the players has zero points and cannot be punished further, or one of the players assigns zero punishment points. Therefore, if the first mover cooperates his payoff is  $\pi_1 = 100 + r - \sum_t p_{1t} - 4 \times \sum_t p_{2t}$ , and the payoff of the second mover is  $\pi_2 = 100 + 6 \times 50 - r - \sum_t p_{2t} - 4 \times \sum_t p_{1t}$ .

If we use the standard assumption of rational individuals with self-regarding preferences, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with and without punishment, is for second movers to return zero points and thus for first movers not to cooperate.<sup>2</sup> The predictions can change if individuals possess other-regarding preferences such as a concern for unequal payoffs, efficient outcomes, and/or reciprocating kind and unkind actions.<sup>3</sup> In the game without punishment, if the frequency of selfish individuals is sufficiently low then there can be equilibria where some second movers return positive amounts and some first movers cooperate. In the

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<sup>1</sup> Note that players can have negative earnings if by assigning punishment points to another player they reduce their own earnings below zero. This way subjects cannot avoid punishment or retaliation by reducing the earnings of others to zero. A show-up fee was given to cover any losses incurred during the experiment.

<sup>2</sup> Note that since punishment is always costly, it is never credible at any stage.

<sup>3</sup> See Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2005), and Falk and Fischbacher (2005).

game with punishment, in addition to individuals who are willing to act kindly, there might be individuals who are willing to punish selfish behavior. If the expectation of punishment leads to higher returns from the second movers, then first movers have an additional incentive to cooperate.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, the first movers' willingness to punish depends on the propensity of second movers to retaliate, which in turn depends on the willingness of first movers to punish once again, and so on. This, in our opinion is a more realistic way of modeling social punishment. If both the punisher and the punished have access to the punishment technology, the punished will always have the opportunity to retaliate. Moreover, both players have the option to avoid further interaction by deciding not to punish and thus ending the game. To our knowledge, no other study examines punishment behavior in such a setting.<sup>5</sup>

## *2.2. Experimental design and procedures*

The computerized experiment was conducted in March 2005 in the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam. In total 162 students participated in the experiment. Approximately 54% were students of economics and the rest came from a variety of fields. The average age was 22 years and 58% of the participants were male.

Each subject played *twice* the social dilemma game described in the previous section. We used a perfect strangers matching protocol to avoid any reputation effects. In total, 26 subjects participated in the baseline treatment, without punishment opportunities. The remaining 136 subjects participated in the punishment treatment. The average earnings were 10.55 euros (this includes a show-up fee of 1 euro). The whole experiment lasted less than one hour. Subjects were recruited through the CREED recruitment website and the experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).

After arrival in the reception room, subjects were randomly assigned to a table in the lab. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the instructions for the

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<sup>4</sup> For example, using the same assumptions they use about the distribution of types, the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts that, in the case of no punishment, 40% of second movers would return 150 points. In this situation only 30% of first movers cooperate (the other 70% prefers to avoid the chance of ending up with extremely disadvantageous inequality). In the case of punishment, there are enough first movers that would punish so that all second movers return 150 points and hence all first movers cooperate.

<sup>5</sup> Nikiforakis (2005) studies punishment in a public good game in which retaliation was possible. However, in this case the punishment phase automatically ended after retaliation.



experiment (see Appendix A). Subjects were told that the experiment consisted of two independent parts. We emphasized the fact that they will interact with different individuals in each part, and that, their choices in the first part will not affect their earnings in the second part. After this, the one-shot social dilemma game was described as the first part of the experiment. When everybody had finished reading the instructions, subjects had to answer a few questions to ensure their understanding of the game. Subsequently, the subjects played the social dilemma game via the computer (part 1). At the end of the first part, instructions were distributed concerning the second part of the experiment. Subjects were told they would be in the same position as in the first part (i.e. first or second mover), and with certainty, their partner would be different partner from the one they had played with in the first part. After they finished the second part (part 2), subjects filled in a debriefing questionnaire. Thereafter, they were paid their earnings in private and dismissed.

To observe if emotional reactions of shame and guilt influence behavior, we used self-reports to measure these and other emotions during the game. We also measured fairness perceptions and expectations concerning the behavior of the other player. Emotions were always measured after subjects observed the choice of the other player but before they made their own choice. Expectations about the behavior of the other player were asked after the subjects made their choice but before they observed the other player's actual choice. Finally, fairness perceptions were measured at the end of the experiment in the debriefing questionnaire.

The social emotions of guilt and shame are characterized by the absence of a clear physiological reaction pattern (Adolphs, 2002). Since the goal of our study it to analyze the influence of these emotions on behavior, we applied self-reports, which are a reliable and often used technique in social psychology (Robinson and Clore, 2002).<sup>6</sup> We also used self-reported measures of expectations and fairness perceptions. Emotions as well as fairness perceptions were measured using seven-point scales.<sup>7</sup> Expectations were measured by asking for a point estimate of the most likely action. Even though our study concerns the influence of anger, shame, and guilt, we measured

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<sup>6</sup> For some emotions, such as anger, self-reports have been shown to be correlated with physiological measures of arousal (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004). This supports the use of self-reports as a trustworthy measure of emotional intensity.

<sup>7</sup> Emotional intensity was measured from: 1 = 'not at all' to 7 = 'very intensely'. The fairness of an action was measured from: 1 = 'very unfair' to 7 = 'very fair'. The questions used are available in Appendix A.


a variety of emotions to avoid influencing subjects in a particular direction. The list of measured emotions included: anger, gratitude, guilt, happiness, irritation, shame, and surprise.

### 3. Observed Behavior

In this section, we give an overview and a brief discussion of the behavior of first and second movers. A summary of the behavioral data can be found in Appendix B. We start by investigating how often first movers cooperate and, when given the opportunity, how much second movers return. Comparing the baseline and the punishment treatments allows us to observe the effect of the punishment institution on the subjects' behavior. Then, in order to explain any differences induced by punishment, we analyze the punishment behavior of first movers as well as the retaliatory behavior of second movers. Finally, we examine whether punishment and retaliation in part 1 have an effect on their behavior in part 2.

#### 3.1. Cooperation and returns

Figure 2 summarizes the main differences between the baseline and the punishment treatment. Namely, first movers cooperate more often and second movers return more in the presence of punishment.



**FIGURE 2 – COOPERATION BY FIRST MOVERS AND RETURNS BY SECOND MOVERS**

*Note:* A) Mean number of points sent by first movers in each part and treatment. Note that, since first movers could send only 0 or 50 points, doubling the amount sent gives the frequency of first movers who cooperate. B) Mean number of points returned by second movers in each part and treatment. For the frequency of second movers sending 0, 50 or 150 points see Appendix B.

As can be seen in Figure 2A, in both treatments, almost all first movers cooperate in the first part (more than 84.6%). However, in the absence of punishment, cooperation decreases substantially in the second part. In contrast, if the opportunity to punish

others exists, first movers cooperate equally often in both parts. Testing for differences between treatments confirms this observation. There is no significant difference in the frequency of cooperation in the first part ( $p = 0.90$ ) but a highly significant difference in the second part ( $p = 0.02$ ).<sup>8</sup> There is an even starker difference between treatments when we consider the behavior of second movers. That is, in part 1 and part 2, second movers return noticeably less in the absence of punishment ( $p = 0.01$  and  $p = 0.07$ ). Given the behavior of second movers, it is easy to understand the decrease in cooperation in the baseline treatment. Remember that first movers who cooperate send 50 points. In the baseline treatment, they receive on average a smaller amount in return. In contrast, first movers who cooperate in the punishment treatment receive back roughly twice the amount sent. It is clear that, even when it is possible to retaliate, punishment limits the opportunistic behavior of second movers.

In spite of this, punishment did not lead to overall higher earnings. In part 1, the average earnings of all participants are actually higher in the baseline treatment (230.8 vs. 189.0 points), whereas in part 2, average earnings are higher in the punishment treatment (187.3 vs. 182.7 points). In neither case is the difference significant ( $p > 0.23$ ). In the following paragraphs, we examine how subjects punish and retaliate.

### *3.2. Punishment and retaliation*


As Figure 3A illustrates (see also Table B1), a large number of subjects are willing to spend some or all of their earnings in order to punish second movers or to retaliate against first movers. In fact, around one third of the cases in which first and second movers interact wind up in punishment by the first movers. If returns were less than 150 points, about two thirds of the interactions end up in punishment (68.1%). When given the opportunity, retaliation by second movers is common but somewhat less frequent (40.0%). We even observe that, of the first movers who had the chance to

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<sup>8</sup> Throughout the chapter, unless it is otherwise noted, we use two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. We use each subject as an independent observation for tests concerning either part 1 or part 2. If we combine the data of both parts, we first calculate for each subject the mean for the variable in question and then compute the test using these means as the independent observations. There are subjects from whom we have, for various variables, data from only one of the parts (e.g. a second mover who faces a first mover who cooperates in part 1 and a first mover who defects in part 2). In these cases, we take the data from the part for which we have information as that subject's mean.

punish second movers who retaliated, 55.6% decided to do so (we refer to this as ‘additional punishment’).<sup>9</sup>

Figure 3B shows that the amount spent on punishment by first movers who got back less than 150 points was clearly higher than the amount spent on retaliation by second movers who got punished ( $p = 0.01$ ). Surely, this is partly explained by the fact that the earnings of first movers when they faced retaliation were lower than the earnings of second movers when they faced punishment. Therefore, since the amount of punishment or retaliation is limited by the earnings of the other player, first movers were able to spend more on reducing the other’s payoff. Still, if we normalize both punishment and retaliation using the maximum amount of points that an individual could assign to the other, we see that first movers are more aggressive punishers than second movers ( $p = 0.09$ ).



**FIGURE 3 – PUNISHMENT AND RETALIATION**

*Note:* A) Frequency of punishment ( $p_{11}$ ), retaliation ( $p_{21}$ ), and additional punishment ( $p_{12}$ ) over both parts. Frequencies are calculated over subjects who had the opportunity to punish/retaliate. B) Mean amount of points spent on punishment ( $p_{11}$ ), retaliation ( $p_{21}$ ), and additional punishment ( $p_{12}$ ) over both parts.

<sup>9</sup> We only observe one case in which the second mover retaliated once again ( $p_{22} > 0$ ). However, this is because in all the other pairs where the first mover punished a second time ( $p_{12} > 0$ ), the first mover ended up with zero points or less and hence the punishment stage ended automatically.

Although it is not predicted by traditional economic theory (assuming own-payoff maximization), the punishment behavior of first movers is not surprising given that similar behavior has been observed in numerous experiments (see Camerer, 2003). Similarly, it is expected that the amount and frequency of punishment increases as the amount returned decreases. First movers who received 150 points punish less and less often than first movers who received 50 or 0 points (in each part  $p < 0.01$ ). While comparing first movers who received 50 points with those who received 0 points shows that the latter punish significantly more only in the second part ( $p = 0.02$ , and in the other cases  $p > 0.28$ ).

We find more intriguing the willingness of second movers to retaliate. After all, these subjects had behaved unkindly by returning less than 150 points. Furthermore, when they had to decide whether they wanted to retaliate, 65.0% of the second movers had earnings that were actually higher or equal to the earnings of the first mover.<sup>10</sup> It is remarkable that 7 (i.e. 53.8%) of these 13 second movers chose a positive amount of retaliation. Unlike for first movers, the retaliatory behavior of second movers does not seem to depend on the actions of the other player.<sup>11</sup> For instance, there is no significant difference in the amount or the frequency of retaliation between second movers who received a large amount of punishment and second movers who received a small amount (above or below median punishment,  $p > 0.50$ ).

It is instructive to calculate how retaliation affects the first movers' 'real' cost of punishment. Whenever first movers punish, they not only incur the cost of reducing the second mover's earnings, but they also risk further losses if the second mover decides to retaliate.<sup>12</sup> If there is no retaliation, the cost of punishment is 0.250 points per point reduced. Including the actual losses due to retaliation increases the average costs of punishment by 0.149 points per point reduced. Nonetheless, even though this

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<sup>10</sup> This tendency to retaliate against punishers could be the reason why we see 'misdirected' punishment in public good games (Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2004; Gächter and Herrmann, 2005). In other words some low contributors might punish high contributors because they expect to be punished by them.

<sup>11</sup> We also find that retaliation does not depend on the amount transferred. There is no significant difference between second movers who returned 50 points and those who returned 0 points ( $p > 0.55$ )

<sup>12</sup> The only case in which second movers cannot retaliate after being punished occurs when first movers who get back 0 points spend all of their remaining earnings punishing the second mover. In this case, both subjects end up with 0 points and no further retaliation is possible. Overall, 24.3% of the cases in which there was positive punishment fit this description.


is a substantial increase of 59.4%, punishment remains an inexpensive tool for the reduction of the second mover's earnings. This might explain why cooperation is sustained in spite of frequent retaliation. However, more generally the impact of retaliation on the costs of punishment will depend on the game played and its parameters. It is possible that in some cases retaliation will drive the costs of punishment to the point where punishment fails to sustain cooperation.<sup>13</sup> A similar analysis for the real cost of retaliation (given losses due to additional punishment) gives that second movers incur an additional cost of 0.763 points per point reduced. This remarkable 305.6% increase might explain why second movers punish less aggressively than first movers do. We now turn to how first and second movers adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2.

### *3.3. Dynamics*

As already noted, the starkest difference between treatments concerning the behavior of first movers is the large decrease in cooperation from part 1 to part 2 in the baseline treatment compared to the punishment treatment. On closer inspection, this difference is due to two reasons. First, as shown in Figure 4A, in the baseline treatment 66.7% of the first movers who got back less than 150 points in part 1 defected in part 2. In contrast, in the punishment treatment it was only 19.0% (the difference is significant,  $p = 0.04$ ). Second, in the baseline treatment more second movers chose to return less than 150 points (81.8% in the baseline treatment vs. 35.6% in the punishment treatment,  $p = 0.01$ ). Hence, it appears that punishment has two desirable effects. On one hand, second movers anticipate punishment and as a result increase the amount returned. On the other hand, after experiencing selfish behavior, first movers are more willing to keep on cooperating if they have the opportunity to punish. In fact, if we examine how first movers in the punishment treatment adjust their behavior, we find that, among the first movers who received less than 150 points, those who punished seem to be more likely to cooperate once again than those who did not punish (see Figure 4B).

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<sup>13</sup> In public good settings, punishment stops sustaining cooperation when the cost of punishing increases over 0.500 per point reduced (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2005).



**FIGURE 4 – DEFECTION IN PART 2 DEPENDING ON THE EVENTS IN PART 1**

*Note:* A) Percentage of first movers who defect in part 2 depending on the amount returned by the second mover of part 1 in each treatment. B) Percentage of first movers who defect in part 2 depending on whether or not they punished the second mover of part 1 for a low return.

We now turn to the effects of punishment on the future behavior of second movers. If we concentrate on second movers who had a good chance of being punished (i.e. those who returned less than 150), we find that, on average, second movers who were not punished decrease the amount returned by 25.0 points whereas those who were punished increase it by 10.0 points ( $p = 0.22$ ). Hence, although actual punishment does promote prosocial behavior, the effect is not particularly strong. In other words, punishment has a bigger impact by deterring second movers from returning low amounts in the first place than by increasing the returns of those who behave selfishly in spite of the threat of punishment. For example, if none of the second movers who returned a low amount had been punished in period 1, the average return in period 2 would have been 87.7 points (instead of 96.6 points). In contrast, if the threat of punishment had not been there at all then the average return would have been as in the baseline treatment (i.e. 41.7 points).

Lastly, we analyze the impact of retaliation on both future cooperation and punishment by first movers. In general, retaliation in part 1 does not deter first movers from cooperating in part 2. For instance, among first movers who punished a low return in part 1, those who received retaliation were as likely to cooperate in part 2 as those who received no retaliation ( $p = 0.64$ ). It is also the case that retaliation does not deter first movers from punishing. Among the first movers who punished in part 1 and then received a low return in part 2, those who had received positive retaliation punished in part 2 as often as those who had received no retaliation ( $p = 0.80$ ). In fact, they punished as often as those who received a low return in part 2 after they had

received a high return in part 1 ( $p = 0.36$ ). The main findings from the behavioral data are summarized in the following result:

*RESULT 1: In the presence of punishment opportunities, cooperation is sustained at high levels. This is because, second movers return more, and first movers who punish do not stop cooperating after experiencing opportunistic behavior. Punishment of opportunistic behavior is common and persistent despite the fact that in numerous cases punishment leads to retaliation by second movers.*

## **4. Emotions and Behavior**

In the following section we investigate the relationship between the subjects' behavior and their emotional response. To begin, we concentrate on the emotions of first movers, and particularly on the relationship between anger and punishment. Subsequently, we analyze what triggers first movers to feel high intensities of anger. We then turn to study the emotional reaction of second movers. First, we investigate the relationship between guilt and the second movers' decision to retaliate. Second, we try to determine what causes second movers to feel guilt.


Throughout the section, we report the results of tests done with the emotion of anger and the emotion of guilt. However, we should note that we find very similar results and significance levels if we substitute anger with irritation or (lack of) happiness, or if we substitute guilt with shame. This hints at the possibility that some of these emotions are in fact measuring the same underlying effect. To confirm whether this is the case we applied principal factor analysis to the emotions data (for the details and the factor loadings see Table C1 in Appendix C). We find three factors that summarize the subjects' emotional response. The first factor can be interpreted as anger-like emotions, the second factor as guilt-like emotions, and the third factor, although less clear, can be seen as a combination of gratitude and happiness.

### *4.1. Anger and punishment*

Throughout the experiment, anger is clearly related to the punishment decision. As is illustrated in Figure 5, first movers who were angry after observing the amount returned by the second mover punish more and more often than first movers who were



not angry ( $p < 0.01$  in both parts).<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, although there are few observations, a similar pattern is observed in the second punishment round. On average, after observing the amount of retaliation assigned to them, first movers who felt angry punish more than first movers who did not feel as angry ( $p = 0.11$  for the amount of additional punishment and  $p = 0.41$  for its frequency).



**FIGURE 5 – ANGER AND PUNISHMENT**

*Note:* A) Frequency of punishment by first movers depending on anger. B) Mean amount of points spent on punishment by first movers depending on anger.

Having found that punishment is related to experienced anger, the question arises what explains the different intensities of anger (the emotional reaction of first movers to the amount returned can be found in Appendix B). In both treatments, the most important trigger of high intensities of anger is simply receiving back less than 150 points. First movers who received 150 points felt lower intensities of anger than first movers who received either 50 or 0 points ( $p = 0.01$ , see Table B3). It is also the case that first movers who received 0 points back were angrier than those who received 50 points back ( $p = 0.03$ ).

In addition to the amount returned, the first movers' expectations have an effect on the intensity of anger. In particular, first movers who overestimated the amount returned by the second mover tended to be angrier than first movers who underestimated it. For example, if we control for the amount that was actually returned by concentrating on first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first movers who were expecting back 150 points were angrier than first movers who were expecting back 50 or 0 points ( $p = 0.01$ ).

<sup>14</sup> Throughout the paper, we refer to a person feeling 'angry' if the reported value for anger was above the median, and as feeling 'not angry' if the value was below or equal to the median. The same is true in the case of guilt.

Lastly, we also observe that the amount of anger experienced by first movers is related to their fairness perceptions. First movers who thought it is unfair to return low amounts were angrier than those who thought that it is fair to return low amounts (below or above median fairness). For instance, if we look again only at first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first movers who thought returning 50 was unfair were angrier than first movers who thought returning 50 was fair ( $p = 0.01$ ).

We get similar results in a regression. Specifically, we estimate anger using the amount returned, the expected amount returned, the perceived fairness of returning 50 points, and some demographic variables. We find first movers feel angrier the less is returned. Especially if they were expecting a return of 150 points or considered low returns to be very unfair (see Table C2 in Appendix C).

Focusing on the emotional reaction of first movers to the amount of retaliation received from the second mover gives a comparable finding. Namely, first movers who faced no retaliation experienced lower intensities of anger than first movers who faced positive retaliation ( $p = 0.04$ , see Table B4). Unfortunately, in this case we do not have enough observations to test for the effects of expectations and fairness perceptions. These findings are summarized in the following result.

*RESULT 2: First movers who punish do so because they are angry. High intensities of anger are triggered by selfish behavior by the second mover, especially if it is unexpected and considered unfair. Retaliation by second movers also makes first movers angry and leads to additional punishment.*


#### *4.2. Guilt and retaliation*

We now turn to the relationship between the emotions and behavior of second movers (the emotional reaction of second movers can be found in Table B5). We find that feelings of guilt are clearly related to retaliation.<sup>15</sup> In particular, second movers who felt no guilt are more likely to retaliate than other second movers. Furthermore, we also find that, for second movers who were punished, experiencing guilt induces them to correct their behavior.

As can be seen in Figure 6A, second movers who felt no guilt after being punished are more likely to retaliate than second movers who felt guilty ( $p = 0.04$ ). We also get a similar result if we test for differences in the amount of points spent on retaliation ( $p = 0.08$ ).

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<sup>15</sup> In contrast, feelings of guilt are not related to the behavior of first movers.



**FIGURE 6 – GUILT, ANGER, AND RETALIATION**

*Note:* A) Frequency of retaliation by second movers depending on anger and guilt. B) Mean amount of points spent on retaliation by second movers depending on anger and guilt.

The effect of guilt can be further described if we analyze the interaction of guilt and anger. Given that anger motivates first movers to punish, one could think that, if second movers get angry when they are punished, anger could motivate second movers to retaliate. Indeed, a simple look at the relationship between anger and retaliation suggests that second movers who are angry retaliate more and more often than second movers who are not angry (see Figure 6). However, these differences are not significant ( $p = 0.77$  for the differences in the amount of retaliation and  $p = 0.82$  for the differences in frequency).

Examining the interaction of anger and guilt clarifies why some of the angry second movers do not retaliate. Second movers who were angry and felt no guilt retaliate more and more frequently than second movers who were angry and felt guilt ( $p = 0.02$  and  $p = 0.02$ ). For second movers who were not angry, there are no significant differences between those who felt no guilt and those who did ( $p > 0.79$ ). Hence, guilt appears to influence the behavior of second movers by suppressing their anger-induced desire to retaliate.

In addition to retaliation, guilt seems to be related to how second movers adjust their behavior from part 1 to part 2. In Section 3 it was shown that second

movers who were punished tend to return more in the subsequent part than second movers who were not punished. However, this effect is not very strong. The emotional reaction of second movers hints that the propensity of second movers to adjust their behavior after being punished depends on whether they felt guilty or not. On average, second movers who felt guilt after being punished increase the amount returned by 50.0 points whereas those who felt no guilt decrease the amount returned by 9.1 points ( $p = 0.11$ ). Next, we explain the differences in the intensities of anger and guilt experienced by second movers.

The most important reason why second movers get angry is simply receiving a positive amount of punishment (see Table B5). For example, second movers who were punished at least once reported significantly more anger than those who were never punished ( $p = 0.01$ ).<sup>16</sup> We further investigate the effect of punishment on anger through a regression. We estimate anger among second movers who received a positive amount of punishment using demographic variables and three variables capturing the interaction between the amount of punishment and the amount returned. The regression is available in Table C3. We find that higher amounts of punishment trigger higher intensities of anger. Furthermore, the increase in anger is bigger when the second mover returns a high amount.<sup>17</sup> This is understandable given that the more a second mover returns, the more undeserved is the punishment.

The clearest trigger of high intensities of guilt is acting selfishly. Second movers who returned 150 points reported lower intensities of guilt than those who transferred less ( $p = 0.02$ ).<sup>18</sup> If anticipated, this type of emotional reaction supports the idea that some individuals will not act selfishly in order to avoid feelings of guilt. We do not find, however, a difference between the intensity of guilt reported by second movers who returned 50 points and those who returned 0 points ( $p = 0.53$ ).

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<sup>16</sup> This is also true if we test only among second movers who returned less than 150 points ( $p = 0.01$ ).

<sup>17</sup> We use three variables  $I^r$  with  $r \in \{0, 50, 150\}$ .  $I^r = 0$  if the amount returned was different from  $r$  and  $I^r$  = the amount of punishment received if the amount returned was  $r$ . We obtain positive and significant coefficients for  $I^0$ ,  $I^{50}$ , and  $I^{150}$  ( $p < 0.02$ ) with the coefficient for  $I^0$  being the smallest and the one for  $I^{150}$  being the largest. The coefficient of  $I^{150}$  is significantly different from those of  $I^0$  and  $I^{50}$  (Wald tests,  $p < 0.01$ ). The coefficient of  $I^{50}$  is higher but not significantly different from the coefficient of  $I^0$  (Wald test,  $p = 0.21$ ). See Table C3 in Appendix C for details.

<sup>18</sup> This result is not driven by the different punishment rates faced by subjects who returned 150 points and by those who returned less. For example, second movers who returned 150 points and were not punished felt lower intensities of guilt than second movers who returned less than 150 points and were not punished ( $p = 0.01$ ).

Interestingly, punishment does not seem to influence the intensity of guilt experienced by second movers. For example, among second movers who returned less than 150, there is no significant difference between the amount of guilt reported by those who were punished and by those who were not ( $p = 0.58$ ).

We do not find that, for a given transferred amount, fairness perceptions influence the intensity of guilt. However, we do find that second movers who thought it is unfair to return low amounts transferred significantly more than those who thought that it is fair to return low amounts (117.5 vs. 59.4,  $p < 0.01$ ). Hence, the apparent disconnection between guilt and fairness perceptions might be due to the correlation between fairness perceptions and the amount returned. A possible explanation for this is that fair-minded second movers feel more guilt when transferring a low amount. Hence, they return a high amount in order to avoid high intensities of guilt. The following result summarizes the findings concerning guilt.

*RESULT 3: Second movers who retaliate do so because they are angry and do not feel guilt. In addition, following the feeling of guilt, second movers are more likely to rectify selfish behavior. High intensities of anger are triggered by punishment, especially if the second mover had returned a high amount. High intensities of guilt are triggered by selfish behavior and are not affected by punishment.*

## **5. Discussion and Conclusions**

In this paper, we have shown that a realistic punishment institution, in which multiple rounds of punishment and retaliation are possible, is an effective tool for the support of cooperative behavior. However, retaliation is a commonly observed behavior that often results in the extreme reduction of the payoffs of the individuals involved. Furthermore, we confirm that anger-like emotions are an important motivation for punishment. Selfish behavior induces anger and thus increases the likelihood of punishment. Lastly, we have shown that the experience of prosocial emotions, namely shame and guilt, restrain angry individuals from retaliating. Therefore, prosocial emotions can be seen as a mechanism managing the behavioral reactions of anger.

It is important to have a good understanding of the motivations and reactions of both the punishers and the punished in order to understand when costly punishment can effectively enforce cooperative behavior. We find interesting that individuals who are willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating. This guaranties that, as

long as these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. In addition, the same type of behavior is necessary to support punishment in the presence of retaliation. If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel (Nikiforakis, 2005). However, if the opportunity to punish back always exists, this could prevent retaliation from limiting the punishment of selfish behavior.

As expected, we find that anger motivates individuals to punish opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, we confirm that individuals feel angrier the more money the other player took (Bosman and van Winden, 2002), the more unexpected was the opportunistic act (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004), and the more strongly the individual felt about fairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). In fact, our results show that each of these motivations has a separate effect on the intensity of anger and thus on the propensity to punish.

Knowing that punishment is triggered by the emotion of anger can help us model this type of behavior. If anger induced punishment gives pleasure to the punisher (Quervain et al., 2004), punishment can be interpreted as the consumption of a good. Thus, allowing us to apply standard economic analysis to an otherwise puzzling phenomenon (see Carpenter, 2004). It is important to point out that the action tendency of anger is to attack (Lazarus, 1991), and thus, to harm whoever is negatively affecting our interests. Therefore, even if anger was triggered by unfair behavior (e.g. deviations from equality or a maximin norm), the goal of angry individuals is to harm the other party, and not, through punishment, to correct unfair material outcomes.<sup>19</sup> For example, if in our game first movers who got back 50 points used punishment to rectify an unfair distribution of income, they should not spend more than 66.67 points on punishment (this amount gives both players equal earnings). However, 31.3% of first movers in precisely this situation punished, at least once, by more than 66.67 points. In this sense, outcome based models of social preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) miss an important characteristic of punishment behavior (see also Reuben and van Winden, 2006).

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<sup>19</sup> In this respect, as is argued by Carpenter and Matthews (2005), there is an important difference between anger-induced punishment by the affected individual and indignation-induced punishment by an unaffected third party.

An important and yet overlooked aspect of punishment is the emotional reaction of the punished. As was shown in this paper, prosocial emotions such as guilt play a crucial role for the use of punishment for the enforcement of social norms. In Section 4 we have shown that feeling guilty helps explain why some individuals who acted selfishly adjust their behavior whereas others do not. It has been observed that in public good games, the use of non-monetary punishment has a positive effect on contribution levels.<sup>20</sup> Non-monetary punishment has the desirable property that it can affect behavior without destroying resources. However, as shown by Noussair and Tucker (2005), the lack of real consequences for free-riders makes this effect deteriorate over time. This suggests that the effect of guilt is not very strong when punishment is only symbolic. Our results indicate that it is the combination of feeling guilty and receiving monetary punishment that has a significant effect on behavior. In this sense, the best performing punishment institution might be one in which both symbolic and monetary punishments are available (Noussair and Tucker, 2005).

Another essential role for guilt is the prevention of retaliation by punished individuals. As is stated in Result 3, even if they acted unkindly, individuals do feel angry when they are punished. However, it is only those individuals who are angry and do not feel guilty that decide to retaliate. Therefore, if it were not for some individuals experiencing guilt, retaliation would be much more common and punishment of selfish behavior much more costly. For example, if second movers who felt guilty had behaved as second movers who did not feel guilty (controlling for anger) then retaliation would have been 69.8% more frequent and 72.4% higher. Furthermore, the decrease in the amount returned from part 1 to part 2 would have been 42.2% more severe. Social emotions like guilt are thus essential for the effectiveness of a punishment institution. This fits the assumption that social emotions coevolved with institutions and anger-like emotions in order to limit antisocial actions (Bowles and Gintis, 2001). An interesting question for further exploration is the specific evolutionary mechanisms that lead to this situation.

Social emotions (like shame and guilt) are characteristic human emotions that facilitate prosocial behavior. Shame and guilt are both ‘self-reproach’ emotions elicited by the individuals’ own blameworthy actions (Ortony, Clore, and Collins,

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<sup>20</sup> For instance, Masclet et al. (2003) use symbolic punishment points and find that, in the short run, they work almost as well as real punishment points. Barr (2001) reports that the public blaming of the free-rider can increase cooperation in future rounds.

1988). This study was not designed to differentiate between the effects of these two emotions. However, we should note that the emotions' action tendencies are different (Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Guilt is related to the blameworthiness of an act and is thus more likely to result in reparation and action. Shame is related to a devaluation of the self and is more likely to result in avoidance of further contact.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, in some settings, increasing feelings of shame (e.g. through framing) will not lead to an increase in prosocial behavior. For instance, if individuals have the possibility to avoid contact altogether, they might prefer to do so instead of participating in an activity where feelings of shame 'force' them to act prosocially (Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2005). Finally, in addition to the effects of social emotions observed in this study, the anticipation of shame and guilt might induce norm-abiding behavior.

## **Appendix A – Instructions**

These are the instructions for first movers in the punishment treatment. The instructions for second movers and for the baseline treatment are available upon request.

### *Instructions for part 1*

There are two types of participants in this part, participants A and participants B. Half of the persons participating in the experiment will be in the role of participant A, and the other half in that of participant B. *You are a participant A.*

In part 1 of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a participant B. During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. Moreover, you will *not* interact again with this participant in part 2 of the experiment. Part 1 consists of three steps. In step one, you must decide whether you will transfer points to participant B or if you will retain the points for yourself. In step two, participant B will decide if he will transfer points to you or if he will keep them himself. In step three, both of you must again make a decision. There are various options in step three, which will be

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<sup>21</sup> Economists usually distinguish shame and guilt by the visibility of behavior. Shame is said to be triggered in social situations in which actions are seen by others, whereas guilt is more related to internalized values and hence is not influenced by the presence of others (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 1992). However, research by psychologists has shown that people feel shame even when their actions are unobserved (Tangney et al., 1996), and that the experience of guilt varies considerably depending on the interpersonal context (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994).



explained below. We will also describe the exact experimental procedure on the next pages.

*Procedure for the three steps*

At the beginning of part 1 you and participant B will each receive 100 points as earnings.

*Step one*

At the beginning of the first step you will receive 50 decision points. Participant B will receive no decision points. In step one, you must decide whether you want to transfer your 50 decision points to participant B or transfer no points to participant B. If you transfer the 50 points, they will be multiplied by six, meaning that participant B will receive  $6 \times 50 = 300$  points. Then, step two begins. If you decide to transfer nothing part 1 will end here.

*Step two*

In step two, participant B has to decide whether he will transfer 150, 50 or 0 points to you. You will then receive exactly the number of points B transferred.

Therefore, four possibilities exist after the first two steps:

	<b>Your additional earnings</b>	<b>B's additional earnings</b>
You retain your decision points.	50 points	0 points
You transfer your decision points and B transfers 150 points.	150 points	150 points
You transfer your decision points and B transfers 50 points.	50 points	250 points
You transfer your decision points and B transfers nothing.	0 points	300 points

Hence, after step two your total earnings will be:

$$100 + \text{the additional earnings from the table above.}$$

*Step three*

In step three, you will be informed how many points participant B transferred to you. Now, you can assign penalty points to participant B. The assignment of penalty points has financial consequences for both participants, A and B. Each penalty point which you assign costs you one point, while four points are deducted from your participant

B. If you assign three penalty points to participant B, this will cost you three points and participant B will have twelve points deducted.

You cannot deduct more points from participant B than his total earnings in that part (i.e.  $100 + B$ 's additional earnings). If participant B has 250 points after step 2, then with your assignment of penalty points you can reduce his earnings by at most 250 points. Hence, as long as your participant B has positive earnings, you can assign him as many penalty points as you want. You can also assign him no penalty points.

Participant B will then be informed how many penalty points you assigned him and how many points were deducted from his earnings. If you decided not to assign penalty points, part 1 will end here. If you assigned penalty points to participant B, he can decide to assign penalty points to you. The assignment of penalty points has the same financial consequences as described above. Each penalty point that participant B assigns to you costs him one point, while four points are deducted from your earnings. You can not be deducted more points than the total earnings you own at that moment. If participant B decides to assign no penalty points to you, part 1 will end here. Note: Participant B can assign penalty points even if his earnings at that point are zero. If he does so, he will lose points in part 1 of the experiment.

If participant B assigned you penalty points, you and participant B will have the option to assign penalty points to each other in turns. Part 1 will end when either you or participant B decides to assign no penalty points, or if either you or participant B can not be assigned penalty points because your or his earnings are zero or less. In other words, as long as one of you assigns a positive amount of penalty points, the other will have the opportunity to assign penalty points back. Note that, you will be able to assign penalty points *even if your earnings at that point are zero*. Furthermore, you *cannot* be assigned penalty points if your own earnings are zero.

*Finally*

Remember that, you participate in part 1 only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully. At the end of part 1 you will receive instructions for part 2 of the experiment.

### *Instructions for part 2*

We will now give you the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.

Also in this part there will be two types of participants, participants A and participants B. Every person participating in the experiment will be in the role they

had in part 1. Therefore, you are a participant A. As in part 1 you will be randomly assigned a participant B. During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. You can be certain that this participant B is not the same person as in part 1.

This part will consist of the same three steps as part 1. Therefore exactly the same instructions apply for part 2 as for part 1. Remember that you will participate in this part only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully.

#### *Examples of questions in the self-reports*

##### To measure emotions:

- Indicate how intensely you feel each of the following emotions right now, *after knowing the amount that B transferred to you?*

The subject then filled in a series of seven-point scales that ranged from 'not at all' (1) to 'very intensely' (7).

##### To measure expectations:

- Player A can now assign you penalty points. How many penalty points do you think A will assign to you?

The subject then entered a point estimate.

##### To measure fairness perceptions:

- Suppose that participant A transfers the 50 decision points to participant B. Participant B has to choose to transfer back either 150 points, 50 points or 0 points. In your opinion, how fair do you believe is each of these choices:  
If participant B transfers back 150 (50, 0) points this choice is ... ?

The subject then filled in three seven-point scales (one for each choice) that ranged from 'very unfair' (1) to 'very fair' (7).

## Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics

Table B1 summarizes of the behavioral data for the punishment treatment.

**TABLE B1 – SUMMARY OF THE BEHAVIORAL DATA IN THE PUNISHMENT TREATMENT**

	<b>Part 1</b>	<b>Part 2</b>	<b>Both parts<sup>22</sup></b>
<i>Cooperation by first movers</i>			
Number of observations	68	68	68
Frequency of cooperation	86.4	86.4	86.4
Mean amount of points sent (cooperation)	43.4	43.4	43.4
standard deviation	(17.1)	(17.1)	(14.7)
<i>Returns by second movers</i>			
Number of observations	59	59	66
Frequency of returning 150	0.644	0.559	0.614
Frequency of returning 50	0.237	0.254	0.227
Frequency of returning 0	0.119	0.186	0.159
Mean amount of points returned	108.5	96.6	103.4
standard deviation	(58.1)	(62.9)	(57.5)
<i>Punishment by first movers</i>			
Number of observations	59	59	63
Frequency of punishment	0.305	0.254	0.278
Mean amount of points spent on punishment	17.3	18.7	18.1
standard deviation	(31.4)	(35.5)	(26.2)
<i>Retaliation by second movers</i>			
Number of observations	16	9	20
Frequency of retaliation	0.375	0.444	0.400
Mean amount of points spent on retaliation	5.5	5.9	5.2
standard deviation	(8.7)	(10.0)	(8.2)
<i>Additional punishment by first movers</i>			
Number of observations	5	4	9
Frequency of additional punishment	0.600	0.500	0.556
Mean amount of points spent on additional punishment	6.2	24.3	14.2
standard deviation	(8.8)	(28.0)	(20.6)

<sup>22</sup> To be precise the data in this column is the mean behavior of each subject across both parts. In other words, first we take the mean behavior across parts for each subject and then we take the mean across all subjects. In the cases where a subject had only one opportunity to take an action, we take the data from that part as that subject's mean.

Table B2 summarizes of the behavioral data for the baseline treatment.

**TABLE B2 – SUMMARY OF THE BEHAVIORAL DATA IN THE BASELINE TREATMENT**

	<b>Part 1</b>	<b>Part 2</b>	<b>Both parts</b>
<i>Cooperation by first movers</i>			
Number of observations	13	13	13
Frequency of cooperation	84.6	46.2	65.4
Points sent (cooperation)	42.3	23.1	32.7
standard deviation	(18.8)	(25.9)	(15.8)
<i>Returns by second movers</i>			
Number of observations	11	6	12
Frequency of returning 150	0.182	0.167	0.167
Frequency of returning 50	0.182	0.333	0.208
Frequency of returning 0	0.636	0.500	0.625
Points returned	36.4	41.7	35.4
standard deviation	(59.5)	(58.5)	(56.9)

The emotional reaction of first movers in the punishment treatment is summarized in Table B3 and Table B4. In the baseline treatment, the emotional reaction of first movers was statistically indistinguishable from the one in the punishment treatment.

**TABLE B3 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF FIRST MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT RETURNED BY THE SECOND MOVER IN THE PUNISHMENT TREATMENT**

<b>Emotions</b>	<b>Got back 150</b>	<b>Got back 50</b>	<b>Got back 0</b>
Anger	1.1	4.5	5.8
standard deviation	(0.5)	(1.9)	(1.5)
Irritation	1.2	5.0	6.1
standard deviation	(0.7)	(1.5)	(1.5)
Happiness	6.1	2.3	1.8
standard deviation	(1.0)	(1.4)	(1.1)
Gratitude	4.9	2.4	1.6
standard deviation	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.1)
Shame	1.2	1.9	2.9
standard deviation	(0.5)	(1.6)	(2.3)
Guilt	1.1	1.3	1.8
standard deviation	(0.5)	(0.9)	(1.7)
Surprise	4.2	3.9	4.5
standard deviation	(1.6)	(1.7)	(2.5)
Number of observations	53	27	17

**TABLE B4 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF FIRST MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT OF RETALIATION THEY RECEIVED FROM THE SECOND MOVER**

<b>Emotions</b>	<b>No Retaliation</b>	<b>Positive Retaliation</b>
Anger	1.9	3.6
standard deviation	(1.5)	(2.2)
Irritation	2.2	4.7
standard deviation	(1.7)	(2.2)
Happiness	3.4	2.6
standard deviation	(1.8)	(1.3)
Gratitude	2.4	2.7
standard deviation	(2.0)	(1.9)
Shame	2.1	1.3
standard deviation	(1.8)	(0.9)
Guilt	2.1	1.5
standard deviation	(1.9)	(1.1)
Surprise	4.8	2.3
standard deviation	(1.9)	(1.6)
Number of observations	14	10

The emotional reaction of second movers is summarized in Table B5.

**TABLE B5 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF SECOND MOVERS AFTER OBSERVING THE AMOUNT OF PUNISHMENT THEY RECEIVED FROM THE FIRST MOVER**

<b>Emotions</b>	<b>No Punishment</b>	<b>Positive Punishment</b>
Anger	1.1	3.7
standard deviation	(0.8)	(1.9)
Irritation	1.3	4.1
standard deviation	(1.2)	(2.3)
Happiness	5.0	2.0
standard deviation	(1.6)	(1.2)
Gratitude	4.0	2.5
standard deviation	(2.0)	(1.5)
Shame	1.2	1.5
standard deviation	(0.9)	(0.9)
Guilt	1.4	1.9
standard deviation	(1.1)	(1.3)
Surprise	2.5	4.6
standard deviation	(1.9)	(2.1)
Number of observations	55	25

## Appendix C – Additional Data Analysis

Table C1 reports the results of applying principal factor analysis to the subjects' emotional response. We report the results when we use the emotional response of first movers to the amount returned and also when we use the emotional response of second movers to the amount of punishment. In both cases, we use orthogonal varimax rotation. Results do not vary significantly if we combine the emotional response of first and second movers or if we use other rotation methods.

TABLE C1 – FACTORS UNDERLYING THE SUBJECTS EMOTIONAL RESPONSE

Factors	First Movers				Second Movers			
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 – h <sup>2</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	1 – h <sup>2</sup>
Proportion of variance explained	0.83	0.18	0.13	–	0.65	0.34	0.15	–
<i>Factor loadings</i>								
Anger	<b>0.85</b>	0.18	0.07	0.23	<b>0.89</b>	0.23	–0.09	0.15
Irritation	<b>0.90</b>	0.12	0.06	0.17	<b>0.86</b>	0.18	–0.13	0.21
Happiness	<b>–0.84</b>	–0.10	0.28	0.21	<b>–0.57</b>	0.05	<b>0.49</b>	0.43
Gratitude	<b>–0.67</b>	–0.04	0.33	0.44	–0.22	0.25	<b>0.51</b>	0.63
Shame	0.33	<b>0.54</b>	0.04	0.59	0.27	<b>0.72</b>	0.08	0.40
Guilt	0.18	<b>0.53</b>	–0.04	0.69	0.23	<b>0.71</b>	0.07	0.43
Surprise	–0.07	0.03	<b>0.50</b>	0.74	<b>0.57</b>	0.24	0.09	0.61
KMO test = 0.78				KMO test = 0.74				

Table C2 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced by first movers after they observed the amount of points returned by the second mover in the punishment treatment. Ordered probit estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject. Note that in the regression we take into account the effect of perceived fairness norms, by estimating the models using the variable 'Fairness of returning 50 points'. The reason for this is that this variable exhibited the most variance among the three variables measuring fairness perceptions. For the variable 'Fairness of returning 150 points', 85.3% of subjects agreed that it was very fair. For the variable 'Fairness of returning 0 points', 83.1% of subjects agreed that it was very unfair.

**TABLE C2 – ORDERED PROBIT MODEL ESTIMATING FIRST MOVERS' ANGER**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>p-value</b>
Return = 50	2.648	0.337	0.000
Return = 0	3.352	0.438	0.000
Expected Return = 50	-0.368	0.338	0.276
Expected Return = 0	-0.891	0.473	0.059
Fairness of Returning 50	-0.226	0.115	0.049
Economist	-0.043	0.302	0.888
Female	-0.322	0.290	0.267
Number of obs. = 118		LR $\chi^2(7)$ = 111.03	
Log likelihood = -96.765		Prob > $\chi^2$ = 0.000	

*Note:* The variables 'Return =  $x$ ' = 1 if the return was  $x$ , and 0 otherwise. The variable 'Fairness of returning 50' ranges from 1 = 'very unfair' to 7 = 'very fair'. Dummy variables: Economist = 1 if economics mayor, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if female, 0 if male.

The coefficients of 'Return = 50' and 'Return = 0' are significantly different from each other (Wald test,  $p = 0.05$ ). That is, anger is higher when the return is 0 points.

Table C3 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced by second movers who received a positive amount of punishment. Ordered probit estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject.

**TABLE C3 – ORDERED PROBIT MODEL ESTIMATING SECOND MOVERS' ANGER**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>p-value</b>
Punishment if Return = 150	0.208	0.074	0.005
Punishment if Return = 50	0.028	0.010	0.004
Punishment if Return = 0	0.021	0.008	0.014
Economist	-0.107	0.411	0.794
Female	0.735	0.622	0.237
Number of obs. = 33		LR $\chi^2(5)$ = 14.18	
Log likelihood = -58.228		Prob > $\chi^2$ = 0.015	

*Note:* The variables 'Punishment if Return =  $x$ ' = amount of punishment if the return was  $x$ , and 0 otherwise. The other variables are the same as in Table C2.

The coefficient of the variable 'Punishment if Return = 150' is significantly different from those of 'Punishment if Return = 50' and 'Punishment if Return = 0' (Wald tests,  $p < 0.01$ ). This indicates that second movers get angrier if they are punished for transferring a high amount. The coefficient of 'Punishment if Return = 50' is higher but not significantly different from the coefficient of 'Punishment if Return = 0' (Wald test,  $p = 0.21$ ).



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